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Abstract
This paper constructs a reciprocal market model of intra-industry
trade in network goods to consider the implications of network exter-
nalities for an optimal tariff policy and the welfare effects of bilateral
tariff reductions. We show that the degree of network externalities
nontrivially affects the sign of the Nash equilibrium tariff. Then, we
prove that network externalities amplify the gains from tariff reduc-
tions. These results help better understand the implications of trade-
related issues in network industries.
∗This paper was presented at the 2009 Western Economic Association International
(WEAI) Pacific Rim Conference at Ryukoku University. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee, Fumio Dei, Yunfang Hu, and Toru Kikuchi for a number of valuable comments
and suggestions. Any remaining error is my own responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, world trade has dramatically grown. As to the
driving forces of such growth of trade flows, Baier and Bergstrand (2001)
provide evidences suggesting that ‘income growth, tariff rate reductions, and
transport-cost declines all contributed nontrivially to the real growth of world
trade’ (p. 19) and that ‘the relative contribution of trade liberalization was
three times that of transport costs.’ (p. 23) Moreover, recent growth in trade
of network goods, e.g., personal computers and computer-related products,
has made both domestic and foreign brands available around the world.1
These facts motivate us to consider welfare implications of trade in network
goods because a change in trade flows possibly has a significant effect on
welfare through network externalities. Network externalities refer to the
situation in which ‘the utility derived from the consumption of these goods is
affected by the number of other people using similar or compatible products.’
(Shy, 2001, p. 3)2
Taking into account these facts, this paper theoretically addresses some
implications of network externalities on trade policies and trade liberaliza-
tion. For this purpose, we formulate a two-country reciprocal market model
of international oligopoly in which consumption of the oligopolized good ex-
hibits an network externality. We show two results. First, we compute and
characterize the Nash equilibrium tariff. An intriguing finding is that the sign
of the equilibrium tariff is highly sensitive to the degree of network external-
ities. Second, we consider the welfare effect of bilateral tariff reductions. It
is shown that the presence of network externalities amplifies positive gains
from freer trade.
1Suh and Poon (2006) empirically attribute export growth of the Korean computer
industry to tariff reductions under Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of the WTO.
Portugal-Perez et al. (2009, p. 13) also find an evidence that ‘East Asian & Pacific
countries are clearly the major source of EU imports’ of information technology products.
2In the literature, ‘network effects’ and ‘network externalities’ are sometimes distin-
guished. For example, Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, p. 135) define the network effect
as ‘the circumstance in which the net value of an action (consuming a good, subscrib-
ing to telephone service) is affected by the number of agents taking equivalent actions.’
According to them, a network externality is one special case of such network effects.
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The relevance of network industries has long been recognized and a body
of literature has been accumulated in industrial organization. Among others,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) present an oligopoly model of network externalities
and explore effects of a change from incompatibility to compatibility. In a
similar model, Economides (1996) shows that new entry can benefit the in-
cumbents under network externalities. While these papers assume a closed
economy, some recent studies apply them to open economies. Extending
the Katz-Shapiro model to accommodate a foreign firm, Barrett and Yang
(2001) examine a rational choice of incompatibility. Kikuchi (2005, 2007)
and Kikuchi and Kobayashi (2006, 2007) extend the models of Katz and
Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996) to consider how network externalities
affect the determinants and impacts of trade. Yano and Dei (2005, 2006)
find an intriguing role of network externalities according to which the mo-
nopolistic firm prices below marginal cost under network externalities and
discrete demand shifts. More recently, Ji and Daitoh (2008) compute the
optimal subsidy to interconnection investments. Klimenko and Saggi (2007)
develop a duopoly model with network externalities to explore the effects of
foreign direct investment. Note however that these predecessors develop few
arguments on trade policies and welfare.
On the other hand, Krishna (1988) and Klimenko (2009) address trade
policy issues in a model of oligopolistic network industries and our interests
partly overlap theirs. Hence, it should be made clear what is differentiated
between this paper and these two works. Krishna (1988) considers the effects
of trade policies, focusing on a unilateral choice by a country. Therefore, she
a priori rules out the possibility that ‘foreign governments may well retaliate
with consequent possible losses for all parties.’ (p. 304) Relaxing Krishna’s
(1988) assumption of no retaliation, we characterize the Nash equilibrium in
which both countries noncooperatively choose the tariff.
The differences between Klimenko (2009) and us are as follows. First, his
result hinges on the assumption that firms play a Bertrand game by choosing
price. In contrast, we focus on the case in which strategic substitutes hold
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by extending a Cournot model of Katz and Shapiro (1985). Second, in his
Footnote 11, Klimenko (2009, p. 542) suggests that it suffices to exclusively
focus on the market of one country. However, we demonstrate that a parallel
no longer survives our model and thus taking into account two segmented
markets is crucial. Third, we address bilateral tariff reductions affect welfare,
which is left an open question in Klimenko (2009).3 With these differences
in mind, we will complement the arguments of Krishna (1988) and Klimenko
(2009). Hence, one should not conclude that our contribution is marginal
and small.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Sec-
tion 3 solves a noncooperative tariff-setting game and characterizes the Nash
equilibrium tariff. Section 4 considers welfare effects of bilateral trade lib-
eralization. Section 5 concludes the paper. Appendix shows the validity
of our core results by relaxing the assumption of the ‘fulfilled expectations
equilibrium’.
II. A MODEL
Consider two identical countries (Home and Foreign), two tradable goods
(Goods 1 and 2) and one factor (labor). All the Foreign variables are as-
terisked. Good 2 (numeraire) is competitively supplied with a unitary input
coefficient so that the wage rate is one in both countries. The market of
Good 1 is segmented and duopolized by a Home firm (firm X) and a Foreign
firm (firm Y). Each firm incurs a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0. Imports are
subject to a specific tariff τ and τ ∗.4
Consumption of Good 1 exhibits a network externality and we employ
Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) formulation. In Home, there is a mass of con-
sumers uniformly distributed in [0, a] each of whom buys either one unit of
3On the other hand, we consider no compatibility standard policy to which Klimenko
(2009) pays special attention.
4Negativity of τ and τ∗ corresponds to an import subsidy. Throughout this paper, we
assume that each country’s government taxes only the firm of the other country. This
assumption is justified invoking that export subsidies are in principle prohibited under the
GATT/WTO rule.
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Good 1 or nothing. We assume that both firms supply a fully compatible
product.5 When consumer r ∈ [0, a] purchases Good 1 from the Home firm
(resp. Foreign firm), her consumer surplus is r+ bZ − p (resp. r+ bZ − p∗),
where r > 0 is consumer r’s intrinsic utility, Z is the worldwide network
size and the parameter b ≥ 0 measures the degree of network externality.
Hence, if both firms are active, we have r + bZ − p = r + bZ − p∗. Letting
p − bZ = p∗ − bZ = p˜, consumer r buys Good 1 if and only if r − p˜ ≥ 0
since purchasing nothing yields zero utility. Thus, any consumer r ≥ p˜ pur-
chases Good 1 and aggregate demand in Home becomes
∫ a
p˜ 1dr = a − p˜.
Since the total supply in Home is x + y, the market-clearing condition in
Home is a − p˜ = x + y which is inverted to get Home’s inverse demand
function: p = a+ bZ − x− y. Foreign’s counterpart is similarly obtained as
p∗ = a+ bZ − x∗− y∗. Therefore, consumer surplus in Home is computed as
∫ a
p˜
(r − p˜) dr = a
2
2
− ap˜+ p˜
2
2
=
a2
2
− a(a− x− y) + (a− x− y)
2
2
=
(x+ y)2
2
,
(1)
where the second equality comes from the market-clearing condition. In a
parallel way, Foreign’s consumer surplus is (x∗ + y∗)2/2.
Under the underlying assumptions, the profit of firms X and Y is respec-
tively defined by
pi = (a+ bZ − c− x− y)x+ (a+ bZ − c− τ ∗ − x∗ − y∗)x∗
pi∗ = (a+ bZ − c− τ − x− y)y + (a+ bZ − c− x∗ − y∗)y∗
Our model comprises three stages. The Home and Foreign governments
noncooperatively choose tariffs in the first stage. In the second stage, con-
sumers form expectations about the size of the network. Taking the tariffs
and consumer expectations, firms play a duopoly game in the third stage. To
solve the game with backward induction, we begin by finding a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Note that in choosing outputs each firm takes Z as given while
5Mobile communication services are a typical example of a network good which has
internationally full compatibility.
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it holds that Z = x + x∗ + y + y∗ ex post.6 Then, the first-order conditions
are
∂pi
∂x
= a+ bZ − c− 2x− y = 0
∂pi
∂x∗
= a+ bZ − c− τ ∗ − 2x∗ − y∗ = 0
∂pi∗
∂y
= a+ bZ − c− τ − x− 2y = 0
∂pi∗
∂y∗
= a+ bZ − c− x∗ − 2y∗ = 0.
In the fulfilled expectations equilibrium, we have Z = x + x∗ + y + y∗.
Substituting this into the above system of equations and solving for outputs,
the equilibrium outputs are
x =
3(a− c) + (3− 5b)τ − bτ ∗
3(3− 4b) (2)
x∗ =
3(a− c)− bτ + (7b− 6)τ ∗
3(3− 4b) (3)
y =
3(a− c) + (7b− 6)τ − bτ ∗
3(3− 4b) (4)
y∗ =
3(a− c)− bτ + (3− 5b)τ ∗
3(3− 4b) . (5)
In order to guarantee the stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we make:
Assumption 1: 3− 4b > 0 or equivalently b < 3/4.
It is easy to find that the maximized profit of firm X (resp. firm Y) equals
x2 + x∗2 (resp. y2 + y∗2). Hence, each country’s welfare U and U∗, which
consists of consumer surplus, profits and tariff revenue, is obtained as
U =
(x+ y)2
2
+ x2 + x∗2 + τy (6)
U∗ =
(x∗ + y∗)2
2
+ y2 + y∗2 + τ ∗x∗. (7)
6Economides (1996) and Barrett and Yang (2001) make the same assumption while Ji
and Daitoh (2008) alternatively assume that consumers make expectations after a duopoly
game. Appendix shows that our results are valid in both cases.
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Substituting (2)-(5) into (6), it becomes a function of τ and τ ∗:
U(τ, τ ∗) =
1
2
[
6(a− c) + (2b− 3)τ − 2bτ ∗
3(3− 4b)
]2
+
[
3(a− c) + (3− 5b)τ − bτ ∗
3(3− 4b)
]2
+
[
3(a− c)− bτ + (7b− 6)τ ∗
3(3− 4b)
]2
+
τ [3(a− c) + (7b− 6)τ − bτ ∗]
3(3− 4b) .
(8)
This defines the Home government’s payoff function in the trade policy game.
Note that Foreign’s counterpart can be defined by U(τ ∗, τ) since both coun-
tries are symmetric.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM TARIFFS
Turning to the first stage of our game, this section characterizes the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium tariff. The government of Home (resp. Foreign)
chooses τ (resp. τ ∗) to maximize U(τ, τ ∗) (resp. U(τ ∗, τ)). The resulting
first-order condition for welfare maximization is
Uτ ≡ ∂U(τ, τ
∗)
∂τ
=
3(9− 20b)(a− c) + (−112b2 + 198b− 81)τ + b(4b+ 3)τ ∗
9(3− 4b)2 = 0
U∗τ∗ ≡
∂U(τ ∗, τ)
∂τ ∗
=
3(9− 20b)(a− c) + b(4b+ 3)τ + (−112b2 + 198b− 81)τ ∗
9(3− 4b)2 = 0.
At this stage, we require two more technical assumptions. The first is the
second-order condition for welfare maximization. This is given by −112b2 +
198b − 81 < 0 or equivalently b < 9/14 ≈ 0.64. The second is the stability
condition, which is∣∣∣∣∣ Uττ Uττ∗U∗τ∗τ U∗τ∗τ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ = (−108b2 + 201b− 81) (−116b2 + 195b− 81)81(3− 4b)4 > 0.
Noting that the second-order condition implies that −116b2 + 195b− 81 < 0,
the stability condition is equivalent to −108b2 + 201b − 81 < 0, i.e., b <(
67−√601
)
/72 ≈ 0.59. Consequently, in order to ensure (i) the second-
order condition for profit maximization, (ii) the stability of the second-stage
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game, (iii) the second-order condition for welfare maximization and (iv) the
stability of the first-stage game, let us make:
Assumption 2: −108b2+201b−81 < 0 or equivalently b <
(
67−√601
)
/72 ≈
0.59.
Solving the above system of the first-order condition for welfare maxi-
mization, the tariff rate in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is computed
as
τN =
(9− 20b)(a− c)
36b2 − 67b+ 27 , (9)
where superscript N indicates the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Be-
cause the denominator is positive from Assumption 2, (9) immediately leads
to:
Proposition 1: The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium tariff is positive (resp.
negative, zero) according as b < 9/20 = 0.45 (resp. b > 9/20, b = 9/20).
The intuitions behind Proposition 1 are as follows. As Brander and
Spencer (1984) show in a reciprocal market model without network exter-
nalities, tariff protection shifts profits from the Foreign firm to the Home
firm. In the presence of network externalities, we have another effect of pro-
tection. Imposing a positive tariff encourages domestic supply of the home
firm, discourages import, and decreases total consumption. This decrease in
consumption has a direct effect of decreasing consumer surplus and an indi-
rect effect of lowering the network size, both of which are welfare-reducing.
What deserves special attention is that the indirect effect through network
sizes crucially affects the firm profit as well as the consumer. As Economides
(1996) shows in a closed economy context, firms can make a larger profit
under network externalities, which implies that the profit-shifting motive of
protection is weakened. Therefore, under a sufficiently strong network ex-
ternality, it is each government’s interest to subsidize import. In contrast,
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when the network externality is small enough, the rent-shifting motive still
plays a dominant role, resulting in an import tariff as shown by Brander and
Spencer (1984).
While Proposition 1 concerns whether the Nash equilibrium tax is either
an import tariff or an import subsidy, it is of another interest to address how
it responds to expansion of network externalities. The result, the proof of
which is left in Appendix, is formalized in:
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium tariff is increasing
(resp. decreasing) in b according as b <
(
36−√736
)
/80 ≈ 0.1108 (resp.
b >
(
36−√736
)
/80).
(Figure 1 around here)
The intuitive explanations behind Proposition 1 are also helpful in con-
sidering Proposition 2. Suppose first that b is small enough and hence the
rent-shifting motive plays a dominant role. Then, an increase in b amplifies
the rent-shifting motive and the resulting tariff level. If, on the other hand,
b is large, the negative effect on consumer surplus and network externality
becomes larger than the positive effect on the firm profit. Therefore, the
government is motivated either to reduce an import tariff or to impose a
negative tariff (import subsidy) to enjoy gains from network externalities.
However, if b is much larger, ∂τN/∂b turns to a positive sign. This is because
the rent-shifting motive once again dominates.7 Accordingly, a higher tariff
is called for as b increases sufficiently.
Figure 1 diagrammatically depicts these considerations. The sign of
∂τN/∂b is positive if b is either sufficiently small or sufficiently large. This is
because in both cases the profit-shifting is a major motive for tariff protec-
tion. In contrast, when b falls in an intermediate interval, the negative effect
on consumers plays a key role in determining the tariff level. Thus, we have
7Recall that an increase in b has a positive effect both on consumer utility and the firm
profit.
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∂τN/∂b < 0, i.e., a strengthened network externality reduces the equilibrium
tariff level.
IV. BILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
The previous section assumes that the Home and Foreign governments non-
cooperatively choose a tariff. While trade policies are still determined non-
cooperatively depending on commodities, tariffs are cooperatively reduced
mainly by the WTO participants as Baier and Bergstrand’s (2001) evidence
suggests. This section turns to the case in which both governments impose
a common tariff and considers welfare effects of bilateral reductions in such
common tariffs.
For this purpose, let us define welfare of each country under the common
tariff. Substituting τ = τ ∗ in (8), we have
U(τ, τ) =
1
2
[
2(a− c)− τ
3− 4b
]2
+
[
a− c+ (1− 2b)τ
3− 4b
]2
+
[a− c+ (1− 2b)τ ] [a− c+ 2(b− 1)τ ]
(3− 4b)2
=
(4b− 1)τ 2 − 2(4b+ 1)(a− c)τ + 8(a− c)2
2(3− 4b)2 ≡ W (τ).
Carefully looking at W (·) above, the presence of network externalities
provides us with two possibilities on the dependence of W on τ . The first
case is that W (·) is strictly convex, which holds if network externalities are
strong enough to have b > 1/4 and the second is that W (·) is strictly con-
cave under b < 1/4. Since the second case is a mere reestablishment of the
well-known result in the literature assuming away network externalities, let
us first address the first case in which network externalities are relevant. In
this case, we can establish:8
Proposition 3: Under 3/4 > b > 1/4, bilateral trade liberalization, i.e., simul-
taneous tariff reductions of both countries, monotonically improves welfare.
8The proof is given in Appendix. Note that Assumption 2 is not needed in the argument
in this section.
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Moreover, an increase in b enhances gains from trade liberalization.9
(Figure 2 around here)
The intuitions behind Proposition 3 are as follows. From Eqs. (2)-(5),
a bilateral tariff reduction leads to an increase in imports and total supply
while domestic supply can both increase and decrease. Therefore, the profit
from exporting necessarily increases and the profit from domestic supply may
or may not increase. However, the former is larger than the latter even if the
latter is negative. As a result, bilateral tariff reductions favorably affect the
monopolistic firm. On the other hand, the consumer necessarily gains from
reduces tariffs because both consumer surplus and network externality are
enhanced.
Proposition 3, which is diagrammatically shown in Figure 2, tells us that
trade liberalization in the form of cooperative tariff reductions is Pareto-
improving in the sense that neither the consumer nor the firm loses from it.
Furthermore, welfare gains are larger as network externalities are stronger.
The underlying reason is the same as that of Propositions 1 and 2. In the
presence of network externalities, trade liberalization benefits not only the
consumer but also the oligopolistic firm since network size expansion posi-
tively affects the firm profit.
(Figure 3 around here)
We close this section by briefly addressing the case of b < 1/4, namely,
W (·) is strictly concave. It immediately follows from (11) that W ′(·) < 0 for
any τ ∈ [0, τ ]. However, when we allow for import subsidies, W (·) reaches a
maximum at
τ˜ =
(4b+ 1)(a− c)
4b− 1 < 0,
9In this section, we need Assumption 1 but not Assumption 2.
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by solving W ′(τ) = 0. In other words, welfare of each country and the world
is maximized if both countries cooperatively choose τ˜ . Summarizing the
findings so far, one can depicts Figure 3 as a locus of W (·) under b < 1/4.
While world welfare maximization is achieved at τ˜ , we can conclude that
bilateral tariff reductions monotonically benefit all countries in this case as
well. In addition, we see that an increase in b shifts up the locus of W upward
as in the case of convex W . Therefore, network externalities can serve as a
driving force for mutually beneficial trade liberalization.10
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have made clear some implications of network externalities for optimal
trade policies and welfare effects of trade liberalization. First, the Nash
equilibrium tariff is computed and some of its properties are characterized.
Second, gains from bilateral trade liberalization are enhanced by network ex-
ternalities, which complements the result of Economides (1996) and Kikuchi
and Kobayashi (2007).
While our results help better understanding of trade liberalization and
trade policies in the contemporary world, all of them are based on many sim-
plifying assumptions. It is our future research agenda to extend the present
attempt to a more general framework and to consider the robustness of them.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating (9) with respect to b yields
∂τN
∂b
=
9 (80b2 − 72b+ 7) (a− c)
(36b2 − 67b+ 27)2 ,
10Note again that this conclusion hinges on the assumption that each government taxes
the other country’s firm only. In addition, it naturally follows that increased b leads to
further import subsidies, i.e., dτ˜/db < 0.
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the sign of which depends on that of the quadratic polynomial on the nu-
merator. As Figure 1 depicts, it is positive (resp. negative) when b <(
36−√736
)
/80 ≈ 0.1108 (resp. b >
(
36−√736
)
/80).11
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof consists of two steps. The first step is to
show that W (τ) defined monotonically increases with b. To show this, let us
differentiate W (τ) with respect to b:
dW (τ)
db
=
2[τ − 2(a− c)][(4b+ 1)τ − 8(a− c)]
(3− 4b)3 ,
which takes zero under either τ = 8(a− c)/(4b+1) or τ = 2(a− c). What we
show is that dW/db > 0 for any τ ≤ τ , where τ is a prohibitive tariff defined
by
τ =
a− c
2(1− b) > 0, (10)
by setting exports to zero.12 Comparing 8(a− c)/(4b+ 1) with τ yields
8(a− c)
4b+ 1
− τ = 5(3− 4b)(a− c)
2(4b+ 1)(1− b) > 0,
which in turn implies that dW/db is always positive for any τ ≤ τ . In other
words, an increase in b unambiguously raises welfare for any tariff level.
The second step is to show that the locus of W (τ) is always negatively-
sloped and becomes steeper as b increases. Differentiating W (τ) yields
W ′(τ) =
(4b− 1)τ − (4b+ 1)(a− c)
(3− 4b)2 , (11)
which is always negative for any τ ≤ τ . Furthermore, differentiating W ′(τ)
with respect to b, the effect of b on W ′(·) becomes
dW ′(τ)
db
=
4 [(4b+ 1)τ − (4b+ 5)(a− c)]
(3− 4b)3 ,
11Note that the larger root of 80b2 − 72b+ 7 = 0, i.e., b = (36 +√736) /80 is ruled out
from Assumption 2.
12Substituting τ = τ∗ into (3) and (4) and setting the resulting expression to zero, (10)
is obtained.
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which becomes zero at τ = (4b+ 5)(a− c)/(4b+ 1). Subtracting this from τ ,
we have
(4b+ 5)(a− c)
4b+ 1
− τ = (2b+ 3)(3− 4b)(a− c)
2(1− b)(4b+ 1) > 0 .
This inequality implies that dW ′(τ)/db becomes negative for any τ ≤ τ , i.e.,
the bigger b, the steeper the slope becomes. Summarizing these results, the
relationship between W and τ is depicted as Figure 1 and we can conclude
that W ′(·) < 0 for any τ ∈ [0, τ ].
Consumers’ expectations before output decision The main text has assumed
that firms’ output decision is made after consumers form expectations about
the size of the network. This appendix shows the validity of the core results
even by relaxing this assumption. The proof completely parallels that of the
text, it suffices to sketch the core argument.
When consumers’ expectations about Z are made after output decisions,
each firm chooses outputs by taking into account their effect on Z. In this
situation, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are
x =
a− c+ (1− b)τ − 2bτ ∗
3(1− 2b) , x
∗ =
a− c+ bτ − 2(1− b)τ ∗
3(1− 2b)
y =
a− c− 2(1− b)τ + bτ ∗
3(1− 2b) , y
∗ =
a− c− 2bτ + (1− bτ ∗)
3(1− 2b) .
Using these, the Home government’s payoff function becomes
U(τ, τ ∗) =
1
2
[
2(a− c)− (1− b)τ − bτ ∗
3(1− 2b)
]2
+
a− c+ τ
3
· a− c+ (1− b)τ − 2bτ
∗
3(1− 2b)
+
a− c− 2τ ∗
3
· a− c+ bτ − 2(a− b)τ
∗
3(1− 2b) +
τ [a− c− 2(1− b)τ + bτ ∗]
3(1− 2b) .
(12)
Similarly, the Foreign government’s welfare is defined by U(τ ∗, τ).
In the first stage, each government noncooperatively determines the tariff.
Thus, solving the system of the first-order conditions Uτ = U
∗
τ∗ = 0 yields
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium tariff:
τN =
(3− 8b)(a− c)
18b2 − 28b+ 9 .
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In order to satisfy (i) the second-order condition for profit maximization,
(ii) the stability of the second-stage game, (iii) the second-order condition
for welfare maximization and (iv) the stability of the first-stage game, we
require the denominator to be positive. Consequently, the sign of τN is
determined depending on whether b is larger than 3/8. If b is so large (resp.
small) that b > 3/8 (resp. b < 3/8), an import subsidy (resp. an import
tariff) is optimal.
Let us turn to the welfare effects of bilateral tariff reductions. Substitut-
ing τ = τ ∗ into (12) yields
U(τ, τ) ≡ W (τ) = (4b− 1)τ
2 − 2(2b+ 1)(a− c)τ + 8(1− b)(a− c)2
18(1− 2b)2 .
Differentiating W (·), we have
W ′(τ) =
(4b− 1)τ − (2b+ 1)(a− c)
9(1− 2b)2 , W
′′(τ) =
4b− 1
9(1− 2b)2 .
Thus, W (·) is negatively sloped at τ = 0. Setting the exports to zero, the
prohibitive tariff is obtained as τ = (a − c)/(2 − 3b) > 0. Substituting this
into W ′(·), we have
W ′ (τ) =
−(b+ 1)(a− c)
3(1− 2b)(2− 3b) < 0,
namely, the slope of W (·) is also negative at τ = τ .
The second derivative computed above provides two possibilities on the
shape of W (·). If b > 1/4 (network externalities are strong enough), W (·)
becomes strictly convex and a figure similar to Figure 2 follows. In a parallel
way, we can depict a strictly concave locus of W (·) if b is small enough (see
Figure 3).
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